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0. Introduction
Not all right actions are morally praiseworthy. We’re hesitant to praise a political 
candidate who advocates deep cuts to poverty-relief programs for washing pots in 
a soup kitchen on the campaign trail. !ere’s no question that volunteering in soup 
kitchens is morally right – perhaps even morally required. But whether an action 
is morally praiseworthy depends not just on whether it conforms to the correct 
normative theory (whatever it is). It also needs to be motivated in the right way. 
An account of moral worth aims to identify what such good motivations consist 
in. My aim here is to develop and defend one particular answer to this question. 
On this answer, morally worthy actions are those that are motivated by the 
rightness of the action. !at is, they are motivated by an agent’s concern for doing 
what’s right and her knowledge that her action is morally right.   
A morally right action has moral worth if and only if it is motivated by moral 
concern (conative requirement) and knowledge that it is the right thing to 
do (knowledge requirement). 
Call this the Rightness Condition. !e Rightness Condition thus makes both 
conative and cognitive demands on the agent’s motivation.
 In the first part of the paper, I defend the Rightness Condition as a 
necessary condition for moral worth. In doing so, I argue contra Smith, Arpaly, and 
others, that moral worth requires a conative attitude with moral content. !e central 
idea is that an agent who acts in a morally admirable way is not only morally 
reliable but also disposed to experience certain reactive attitudes, such as guilt, 
blame, praise. To be disposed to experience such reactive attitudes, an agent’s 
motivation must have moral content; she must conceptualize her action in moral 
terms. 
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 In defending the knowledge requirement, I appeal to a central feature of 
morally worthy actions that has been suggested by Kant:
In the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that it [i.e. the 
action] conform with the moral law but it must also be done for the sake of the 
law; without this that conformity is only very contingent and precarious, 
since a ground that is not moral will indeed now and then produce actions 
in conformity with the law, but it will also often produce actions contrary to 
law.2
Morally worthy actions are motivated in a way that makes their rightness neither 
“contingent” nor “precarious” – they are counterfactually robust. By appealing to 
moral knowledge, we can spell out the nature of this counterfactual robustness in a 
plausible and principled way.
 !e second part of the paper argues that the Rightness Condition is 
sufficient for moral worth. !is has particular implications for the recent debate 
about moral testimony. Moral testimony can be a source of moral knowledge, and 
so, on the Rightness Condition, it can give rise to morally worthy actions. I argue 
that we should welcome this implication.  
 !e third part of the paper argues that the Rightness Condition gives us a 
nuanced framework for how to think about agents who lack moral knowledge. It 
accommodates the intuitive thought that there is often much to admire about 
such agents while remaining clear-sighted about their moral limitations.
1. Some Clarifications
Before we start, two clarifications will be helpful. !e first concerns what exactly 
moral worth is about. I am interested in when it’s appropriate to praise an agent in 
the sense that she is praiseworthy for the action. Praising agents is itself something 
we do and we may do it for all kinds of reasons other than that the action merits 
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praise. If you hold a gun to my head, I’m going to praise your “exquisite” singing 
even if sense of key is questionable. In this case it may be prudentially appropriate 
that I should praise it. But you are not praiseworthy for your performance: you do 
not deserve credit for your playing. So, the sense of being praiseworthy that I’m 
interested in is what we mean when we say that an agent “deserves credit for her 
success”. We often contrast the cases in which the agent deserves credit with cases 
in which it was a matter of chance or luck that the agent succeeded. Even if our 
actual practice of praising agents is somewhat messy, I believe we have a good 
enough grip on this notion of praiseworthiness to provide us with a starting point 
for a philosophical investigation.     
 Secondly, when I refer to right actions being morally praiseworthy, I use 
the term ‘morally right’ broadly to include not just actions that are morally 
required but also those that may not be required but are nevertheless morally 
good. !us, if there are supererogatory actions, they are morally right, even if they 
are not morally required. 
2. Is the Rightness Condition Necessary? 
To satisfy the Rightness Condition, an agent must meet both a conative and a 
knowledge condition: the agent must be motivated by concern for doing what’s 
right and she must know what the right thing to do is. In this section I argue that 
both of these conditions are necessary for morally worthy actions. !us, I defend 
the claim:
A morally right action has moral worth only if the agent is motivated by 
concern for doing what’s right (conative requirement) and knowledge of 
what the right thing to do is (knowledge requirement). 
My argument proceeds in two steps: section 2.1 motivates and defends the 
conative requirement, section 2.2 focusses on the knowledge requirement. 
3
2.1 !e Conative Requirement 
One central feature of morally worthy actions is that they are not merely 
accidentally right. To see this, consider some examples of actions whose 
‘conformity with the moral law’ clearly just is a fluke. An example is Kant’s 
shopkeeper who deals honestly with his customers because he wants to keep his 
business profitable; he doesn’t care that it is the right thing to do. Right actions 
that are motivated by selfish or ulterior desires strike us as unacceptably flukey and 
rightly so. Insofar as the shopkeeper is motivated solely by a desire for profit, it is a 
matter of luck that he chose the right course of action. Had it been profitable to 
cheat his customers, he may have done that. His doing the right thing is a 
consequence of a fortuitous alignment of what suits his desire for profit and what’s 
morally right.
 !e Rightness Condition rightly excludes such actions from having moral 
worth since such actions fail to satisfy the conative condition:
A right action has moral worth only if it was motivated by moral concern.  
 Moral concern is taken as concern for doing what’s right. It is meant to be 
understood broadly enough to include such conative states as a desire to do what’s 
right, an intention to do what’s right, etc. What’s important is that the concern for 
doing what’s right be non-instrumental: the agent must care about what’s right for 
its own sake, and not because doing so would further some other goal. !us, the 
shopkeeper’s honest dealings with a customer are not praiseworthy because insofar 
as he is motivated by a desire to do what’s right, this desire is merely instrumental.  
 It’s uncontroversial that there should be some conative requirement for 
morally worthy actions; most accounts of moral worth subscribe to a version of the 
conative requirement in order to exclude cases such as the Kantian shopkeeper. As 
Barbara Herman has argued: 
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...when we say that an action has moral worth, we mean to indicate (at the 
very least) that the agent acted dutifully from an interest in the rightness of 
his action: an interest that therefore makes its being a right action the 
nonaccidental effect of the agent's concern.3
 !e Rightness Condition departs from recently popular proposals by 
insisting that moral worth requires a conative attitude with moral content: it 
requires that the agent be motivated by, for example, a desire to do the right thing. 
In contrast, Arpaly argues that while moral worth requires that an agent be 
motivated by moral concern, moral concern should be understood as concern for 
those nonmoral features of an action which make an action right:  
Moral concern is to be understood as concern for what is in fact morally 
relevant and not as concern for what the agent takes to be morally relevant. 
[...] To say that a person acts out of moral concern is to say that a person 
acts out of an intrinsic (noninstrumental) desire to follow (that which in fact 
is) morality, or a noninstrumental desire to take the course of action that has 
those features that make actions morally right.4 
 !us, an agent can be morally praiseworthy when she is motivated by a 
desire to relieve suffering, feed the hungry, help the needy – whether or not she 
conceives of those as right-making reasons. Similarly, Markovits argues:
According to what I will call the Coincident Reasons !esis, my action is 
morally worthy if and only if my motivating reasons for acting coincide with the 
reasons morally justifying the action—that is, if and only if I perform the 
action I morally ought to perform, for the (normative) reasons why it 
morally ought to be performed. My motivating reason for performing some 
5
3 Herman [1981], p. 366. 
4 Arpaly [2003], p. 84
action in this case will not be the duty-based reason “that the moral law 
requires it” but the reasons for which the moral law requires it.5
 Contra Arpaly, Markovits, Stratton-Lake then, I argue that being 
motivated by de re desires is not enough for moral worth. Moral worth requires a 
conative attitude with moral content. 
 Consider first an agent who does the right thing and is motivated by an 
individual de re desire for the relevant right-making reason. Jean’s friend missed 
her bus to work and frets over being late to an important meeting; coming late 
would be a great embarrassment to her. Wanting to spare her friend a major 
embarrassment, Jean gives her a ride. Let’s assume that giving her friend the ride 
is the right thing to do in these circumstances and the fact that it spares her friend 
a major embarrassment makes it right. !us, Jean is acting from a de re desire for a 
right-making reason. Does Jean’s action have moral worth? 
 A central feature of morally worthy actions is that they are not merely 
accidentally right. Given Jean’s motivation, it’s not a fluke that Jean spared her 
friend a major embarrassment. But it is a fluke that she did the right thing. !ere 
are plenty of circumstances in which sparing one’s friend a major embarrassment 
is outweighed by other morally relevant factors. In these cases, Jean’s motivating de 
re desire would lead her to do the wrong thing. For example, Jean ought not 
murder her friend’s ex-boy friend, even if doing so would eliminate a major source 
of embarrassment in her friend’s life. Hence, if what motivates Jean is solely a de re 
desire for the particular right-making reason, then it’s a matter of luck that she 
acted rightly. And so, her doing the right thing seems to “precarious” for her action 
to have moral worth. 
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we must abandon the idea that a morally good person would be disposed to be motivated to 
do what she should by the thought of duty, and a fortiori the idea that she would be 
disposed to be motivated solely by this thought. (p. 27)
An isolated de re desire will not do. But suppose Jean’s psychology is so constituted 
that whatever the right-making reasons are, Jean will be motivated by de re desires 
for those reasons. Since Jean’s de re desires track the right-making reasons, it’s not 
an accident that Jean performs the right action; her doing the right thing is 
counterfactually robust. But suppose that Jean does not conceptualize these right-
making reasons as right-making reasons. When the right thing to do is to help her 
friend, Jean is simply moved by the de re desire to help her friend. !us, it seems 
an agent’s right action may well be non-accidentally right –  after all, the agent 
reliably does the right thing – even though she is not motivated by a desire with 
moral content. Wouldn’t this be enough for moral worth?  
 I don’t think it would. Moral worth is about more than just about moral 
reliability. What matters for whether an agent is morally admirable for doing 
what’s right is not just which other actions she would perform under various 
counterfactual scenarios.6 It also matters which reactive attitudes she is disposed to 
experience. Suppose that for whatever reason, Jean is prevented from doing what’s 
right and helping her friend. Would she feel guilty and remorseful? Or suppose 
that Jean witnessed someone else failing to help their friend when it’s right to do 
so. Would she respond with moral indignation? I doubt that we would be inclined 
to admire Jean for helping her friend, if Jean was not disposed to feel any guilt and 
remorse, had she failed to do so. I also doubt that we would admire her right 
action if she was not disposed to react with blame and outrage if someone else 
refused to help their friend in similar circumstances. But to be disposed to 
experience such reactive attitudes, an agent must conceive of her action in moral 
terms: she must care about it as the right thing to do. 
 Why do reactive attitudes such as guilt, moral regret, moral praise and 
blame require the agent to conceptualize her action in moral terms? Consider 
what is involved in feeling guilty. To feel guilty is not just a matter of feeling bad 
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or unhappy. Nor is it a matter of feeling this way because one’s desires have not 
been satisfied. I may feel frustrated when I didn’t succeed in satisfying my desire 
to buy avocados because I left it until too late the store had run out. And I may 
feel unhappy because my desire to help my friend to get to work on time was 
frustrated by the massive traffic jam that we got stuck in. But this sense of 
frustration or unhappiness is not guilt. Guilt requires conceiving of one’s actions 
as contrary to what one should have done, not merely as contrary to what one 
wanted to do.7 It involves feeling bad because one considers oneself as failing with 
respect to a moral standard. Feeling guilty thus essentially involves both affective, 
cognitive, and conative components. !is means that to be disposed to feel guilty 
for failing to perform an action, an agent must conceive of it as something that she 
morally ought to do and not just as something she wants or feels compelled to do. 
And she must care about doing it because it’s the right thing to do, i.e. under the 
relevant moral description. 
 Similarly, to feel moral indignation or to blame another person is not just a 
matter of feeling angry or upset with someone. Nor is it a matter of feeling 
frustrated because others fail to act in ways we want them to act. I may feel 
frustrated when my favorite soccer player slips and bungles her penalty kick. And 
I may feel upset because the nurse vaccinating my child against tetanus thereby 
hurts her arm. But this feeling of frustration or upset is not the same as moral 
indignation or blame. Blame and moral indignation require the recognition that 
someone has acted as they should not have and not merely as we don’t want them 
to act. It’s a matter of feeling a certain way because one regards the other person as 
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having fallen short of a moral standard –  as having not just hurt but wronged 
someone. Just like guilt then, moral indignation and blame essentially involve 
cognitive, affective, and conative components. One cannot be disposed to blame 
others for breaking their promises unless one conceptualizes breaking promises as 
the wrong thing to do and one cares about doing what’s right.8
 !us, there is something defective about an agent’s motivation when she 
acts solely on a de re desires, even when they result in her doing the right thing. 
We can bring this out by considering an agent who is only ever so motivated, who 
has no desires with moral content in her motivational set at all. Such an agent 
would be incapable of experiencing any of those reactive attitudes that we regard 
as central to our practice of holding each other morally responsible. While reliably 
keeping promises herself, she would not be disposed to respond to evidence that 
she may have unwittingly broken her word with guilt and regret. She would be 
disposed to get frustrated when others don’t stay true to their word but she would 
not be disposed to blame them or feel moral indignation. Such an agent would be 
like a robot who has been programmed to perfectly respond to whatever the 
circumstances might be. She would strike us as less than fully human. In fact, we 
may raise doubts whether such an agent would even be a moral agent – someone 
who can be held morally responsible and who is eligible for moral praise and 
blame. After all, moral agency is closely tied to being the object of reactive 
attitudes.9 But plausibly to be the object of such attitude presupposes that one 
participates in the kind of relationships that give rise to such attitudes. Such 
relationships require reciprocity: blame may only appropriate towards someone 
who is at the very least capable of feeling guilt and remorse. !us, there is some 
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reason to think that being an object of reactive attitudes may well presupposes that 
one can be also their subject. 
 I have said that moral worth requires moral concern: conative attitudes 
with moral content. But it’s important that moral concern should not be equated 
with “concern for what one believes to be right”. Much resistance to the conative 
requirement rests on conflating the first with the second. !us, Arpaly objects to 
Herman, who argues that to have moral worth an agent’s motivation must involve 
“an interest in the rightness of his action” as follows:
Herman is mistaken if “an interest in the rightness of his action” is 
interpreted in the most obvious way – that is, as an interest in doing the 
right thing or the moral thing under this description, in a de dicto sense: a 
concern for doing what one feels or believes, even as a background belief, 
that one morally ought to do.10
 Similarly Smith objects to the view that a good person must be acting 
from a desire with moral content, a desire to do what’s right on the grounds that 
“good people” do not just care about “doing what they believe to be right.”11  
 But a desire to do what’s right is not a desire to do what one believes is 
right. Of course, if Jean wants to do what’s right, she will tend to act in accordance 
with her judgments and beliefs about what morality requires. But if it turns out 
that her judgment led her astray, Jean’s desire will, by her own lights, not have been 
satisfied. Jean will experience some of the reactive attitudes discussed above – 
regret, guilt, remorse. If, on the other hand, Jean desired to do what she judged to 
be right, she would receive news of having made a mistaken judgment with perfect 
equanimity: “Who cares if I was mistaken about what is right. I succeeded in 
performing the action that I judged to be right; this is all I wanted.” Such an agent 
would indeed be troubling. Even if she acted rightly, her actions would hardly 
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strike us as morally admirable. !e Rightness Condition explains why: the 
conative condition requires an agent to act from a desire to do what’s right, not 
from a desire to do what she judges to be right.
 !ere is more to morally worthy actions than just moral reliability. !e 
agent must be morally reliable in the right way –  in a way which allows her to 
experience the range of reactive attitudes that we take to be essential to moral 
agency. But this, in turn, requires that the agent’s motivation have moral content. 
De re desires, no matter how finely tuned, are not enough.
2.2 !e Knowledge Requirement
One kind of “accidentality” that’s incompatible with moral praiseworthiness is 
when an agent performs a right action but from an ulterior or selfish desire. But 
sometimes the conative condition is met and yet the agent’s right action seems 
worryingly accidental. Consider, for example, a bureaucrat like Eichmann, who 
seems to care about doing what’s right but has a deeply misguided conception of 
what morality requires: he believes that doing what’s right requires unquestioning 
obedience in carrying out the orders of his superior. Suppose that, for once, this 
superior does order our bureaucrat to do something that’s morally right: send 
some supplies to the needy, for example. !us, the agent does what’s right and he 
is motivated by concern for doing what’s right. Yet, intuitively, he is not morally 
praiseworthy for his action. 
 !e Rightness Condition rightly excludes such actions from moral worth. 
!is is because it says: 
A right action has moral worth only if the agent knows that it is the right 
thing to do.  
 Even if we grant that the bureaucrat genuinely wants to do what’s right, 
he doesn’t know that the action he’s performing is the morally right thing to do. 
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His superiors clearly aren’t a reliable source of moral guidance. And so, it’s a 
matter of luck that following their orders, the bureaucrat did the right thing.
 Together with the conative requirement, the knowledge requirement 
ensures that there is a counterfactually stable link between an agent’s motivation 
and her right action. Knowledge is by its nature counterfactually robust: if an agent 
knows that p, then her belief is safe: she could not have easily believed that p 
falsely.12 And so, if an agent is motivated by concern for doing what’s right and 
she knows what the right thing to do is, then it’s hardly a fluke that she acts 
rightly. !e Rightness Condition thus makes precise the intuitive thought that 
praiseworthiness is incompatible with some ways of getting it right by accident. 
 !e knowledge requirement gives us a principled response to a general 
difficulty for alternative accounts that try to take the counterfactual robustness of 
morally worthy actions seriously. !e challenge is to spell out just how much and 
what kind of counterfactual robustness right actions must manifest for moral 
worth. As Markovits rightly notes:
We all have our breaking points, whether they’re triggered by threats to our 
own interests or to the interests of those we love. So a criterion for moral 
worth according to which our being motivated by the right-making reasons 
would have to be completely independent of contingent circumstances for 
our acts to count as morally worthy entails that virtually no acts at all would 
qualify.13
 Markovits describes the case of a dog-lover, who risks his life to save a 
drowning stranger. However, had his dog been present, he would have been too 
12
12 !e question how exactly to characterize the counterfactual robustness of knowledge is subject to 
on-going debate. But there is wide agreement that knowledge implies some counterfactual stability. 
Williamson [2000], in particular, argues for safety as a condition for knowledge. See also Hawley 
[2003] for a discussion of counterfactual stability of knowledge how.  
13 Markovis [2007], p. 212.
distracted or perhaps unwilling to abandon the dog. If we insist that what matters 
for moral worth is not just how an agent was in fact motivated but how she would 
have been motivated in different circumstances, then we must conclude that the 
dog-lover does not deserve any praise for his heroic deed. 14 But clearly, it is 
unreasonable to demand that to have moral worth, the agent need to have acted 
rightly no matter what. Some contingency clearly is compatible with moral 
praiseworthiness. !e question is: where to draw the line? Markovits argues that 
there is no principled line to be drawn and concludes that we should give up on 
counterfactual robustness as a mark of moral worth altogether.
 I think Markovits is right that the views she discusses – she targets in 
particular Arpaly’s and Stratton-Lake’s accounts – do not succeed in drawing such 
a principled distinction.15 But her drastic conclusion is not warranted.
 For one, on the Rightness Condition, morally worthy actions are non-
accidentally right because they are motivated by moral knowledge and concern for 
doing what’s right. !ey do not have moral worth in virtue of being 
counterfactually robust in certain ways. !e Rightness Condition not only makes 
this feature of moral worth precise, it also explains it. The Rightness Condition 
rightly excludes odd and deviant cases, in which the agent couldn’t have done but 
the right thing – for example, in which the agent correctly guessed what the right 
thing to do is but a scheming demon would have intervened if she hadn’t guessed 
correctly. 
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15 Both accounts take a second-order dispositional motive to be necessary for moral worth. On 
Apaly’s [2003] account it’s important that the agent wasn’t just actually motivated by the right-
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motivated by right-making reasons, but it must be true that she wouldn’t have performed the 
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 Second, the  Rightness Condition tells us in which way morally worthy 
actions are non-accidentally right: the counterfactuals that matter are simply those 
that come from our best account of knowledge.
 On a plausible reading of the case, the Rightness Condition can 
accommodate the dog lover’s admirable deed: insofar as the dog lover is morally 
competent, he knew that saving the stranger is the right thing to do. (After all, 
this is hardly moral rocket science.) And insofar as he was motivated by a desire to 
do what’s right, rather than, for example, a desire for glory, then he is morally 
praiseworthy for his action. Given his motivation, it’s not a fluke that he acted 
rightly. It doesn’t matter that he may have been motivated differently had his dog 
been present.
 To see that it’s plausible that only actual motivation matters, consider a 
nonmoral case: a competent surgeon who performs a successful appendectomy. If 
she wanted to do what’s medically right and she knew what that was, then it’s 
hardly a fluke she succeeded in doing what’s right. And so she deserves credit for 
her success. We do not give her any less credit just because had she stayed up all 
night with her sick child, her motivation would have been different: she may have 
been to tired to figure out how to deal with a complication or overcome by 
worries, she would not have cared much about doing what’s right for her patient.  
 !e Rightness Condition is less demanding than accounts of moral worth 
that require that the agent would have done the right thing in various 
counterfactual scenarios: it just requires that, as a matter of fact, she was motivated 
by moral concern and knowledge of what the right thing to do is. Nevertheless, 
the knowledge requirement has been criticized for making morally worthy action 
too hard to achieve. In the remainder of this section I hope to dispel these worries. 
I will first argue that nothing weaker than knowledge will do: to settle for 
justification, or justification and truth is to give up on the thought that morally 
praiseworthy actions are non-accidentally right. Second, I will argue that the 
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Rightness Condition accommodates the intuition that there is often plenty to 
admire in agents who, through no fault of their own, fall short of moral 
knowledge. 
 Consider the following example:  
Peter read that spinach has a lot of iron. Based on this information, he 
concludes that it’s good for his child’s development and that feeding it to his 
child is the right thing to do. As it happens, the information is misleading: 
spinach contains very little iron. 
It seems both implausible and ungenerous to deny that there is something morally 
admirable about Peter’s giving his child spinach. But Peter does not know that this 
is the right thing to do. And so, it seems that moral knowledge cannot be a 
necessary requirement for moral worth. 
 One strategy to accommodate such cases of blameless moral ignorance is 
to appeal to the observation that while Peter may be mistaken about the iron 
content in spinach, he still seems to be acting on good reasons. After all, he is 
justified in believing that giving his children spinach is the right thing to do. !us, 
Markovits argues: 
Because the reasons relevant to moral-ought claims are subjective – they 
depend on what an agent ought to believe about her situation – our 
normative reasons for acting can’t be given by facts of which we’re blamelessly 
ignorant [...].16
 Peter does have good reasons for feeding his child spinach; he has expert 
testimony that it contains a lot of iron. !us, we might argue that moral worth 
does not require knowing what the right thing to do is, it just requires having 
adequate grounds for taking something to be the right thing to do. Rather than 
being a matter of knowledge, it’s a matter of justification. And whether one’s 
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actions are justified is determined by the agent’s epistemic situation – not by what 
it is in fact the right thing to do. 
 But mere justification cannot be enough for morally worthy actions. !is is 
because an agent can be justified in believing herself to act rightly, when she is in 
fact acting wrongly. And in such cases, the agent is not morally praiseworthy for 
her actions. Imagine Ann who grows up in a very remote and tight-knit 
community. Her friends and neighbors are honest and kind people who help each 
other out and are welcoming to strangers, rare as they may be. Unfortunately, there 
is consensus in Ann’s community that gay marriage is a great moral evil. Ann has 
never met a gay person and her belief is not based on hatred or dislike of gay 
people. Rather, she has acquired her belief that same-sex marriage is a moral evil 
along her other moral beliefs, such as that one should keep one’s promises, that 
one should be kind to others, that one should not be cruel to animals. It strikes her 
as intuitively obvious that same-sex marriage is ‘different’ from ‘regular’ marriage 
and that this difference is morally relevant. Since her community is so remote, she 
has had the chance to encounter someone who would challenge her view on same-
sex marriage. Were she to encounter such a person, it would prompt her to 
critically scrutinize her convictions, rather than holding on to them dogmatically. 
 It seems plausible that Ann could be blameless for her moral ignorance. 
Her moral ignorance is the result of epistemic bad luck: her sheltered upbringing. 
She has no reason to distrust the community consensus or her own intuitions on 
this particular issue and those around her are morally reliable on other moral 
questions. And so, it seems, Ann’s belief that same-sex marriage is a moral evil, 
while misguided and unfortunate, may well be justified. 
 Now suppose that Ann signs a petition against same-sex marriage. By her 
own lights this is the right thing to do. And she is doing so for ‘good’ reasons – 
after all, she is justified in taking same-sex marriage to be morally impermissible. 
!us, if justification suffices for moral worth, it seems that Ann is morally 
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praiseworthy for signing a petition against same-sex marriage. But this cannot be 
right. Signing a petition against same-sex marriage is morally wrong. Insofar as 
Ann’s belief that she’s doing the right thing is sincerely held and justified, it may 
be plausible that we should not blame her for her moral mistake. Surely, however, 
we should not give her moral credit for following her misguided conscience. !e 
Rightness Condition offers a straightforward explanation for why Ann fails to be 
morally praiseworthy for signing a petition against same sex marriage. Signing the 
petition is morally wrong, and so Ann cannot know that it’s the right thing to do. 
Insofar as her belief that same-sex marriage is morally impermissible is 
epistemically justified, she may well not be blameworthy for signing the petition. 
Doing the best you can, given your epistemic situation, may well excuse you from 
blame. But it’s not enough for earn you moral praise when, despite your best 
effort, you get it wrong. 
 What if we require justification and truth? Unlike Ann, Peter’s belief that 
spinach is nutritious is both justified and true. But if it’s a central feature of 
morally worthy actions that they are not just right but non-accidentally so, 
justified true belief in the absence of knowledge will not do. Insofar as an agent’s 
justified true belief that an action is right falls short of knowledge, her doing the 
right thing looks worrisomely accidental.   
 !is is best illustrated with nonmoral cases. Consider a doctor, who based 
on the her patient’s lab results diagnoses her with iron deficiency and prescribes a 
nutritional supplement, recommending a common brand of it to the patient. 
Unbeknownst to her doctor, the lab technician made a mistake. !e patient is 
doing fine on her iron level but she suffers from a vitamin B12 deficiency. 
Fortunately, the particular brand of nutritional supplement includes both iron and 
vitamin B12. !e doctor’s belief that the particular supplement will help the 
patient is thus true. It is also justified – after all, the lab results provide the doctor 
with good reason for believing that the patient suffers from an iron deficiency. But 
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does the doctor deserve credit for prescribing the correct nutritional supplement? 
Intuitively, not. While she did get the treatment right, her success was an accident. 
!is is because the doctor did not know that the patient had a B12 deficiency and 
hence did not know that the nutritional supplement was the correct treatment.17
 A second kind of example that raises doubts that justified true belief can 
suffice for praiseworthiness involves lottery cases. Take, Sam who bought a ticket 
to a lottery, having good reason to believe that this lottery is rigged so as to make 
his winning inevitable. Unbeknownst to Sam, the relevant mechanism 
malfunctions on this particular occasion. Nevertheless, through a very unlikely 
turn of fortune, Sam’s ticket is drawn! Does Sam deserve credit for winning the 
lottery? Intuitively, not. While it would be appropriate to congratulate Sam, it 
would not be appropriate to praise him. !is is because Sam did not know that his 
was the winning ticket and he did not know how to win the lottery. Given that he 
did not know, his success was a lucky accident. 
 In nonmoral cases justified true belief does not seem to be enough to 
deserve credit for one’s success. !is is because without knowledge an agent’s 
success seems worryingly accidental. Does this carry over to moral cases? It would 
be strange if things were different for cases involving moral beliefs. After all, our 
practice of attributing moral worth to particular actions is just a special case of our 
general practice of praising agents for success. We praise the detective for catching 
a murderer, the tennis player for nailing her shot, the surgeon for making the 
correct diagnosis. Moral praise is just a special case of this general practice. When 
we attribute moral worth to an action, we are praising agents for moral success: we 
are praising them for having done the morally right thing. And so, it would be 
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17 My examples and discussion here follow Gibbons [2001]. Gibbons uses them to argue for a 
different conclusion: that knowledge is necessary for intentional action. I’m not committed to this 
conclusion here; my argument only appeals to the claim that, without knowledge, the action’s 
success is accidental in a way that’s incompatible with praiseworthiness. See also Hawthorne and 
Stanley [2008].
very odd if our practice of praising agents for nonmoral success required 
knowledge but our practice of moral praise did not. 
 !us there are two reasons for why mere justification, in the absence of 
moral knowledge, cannot suffice for moral praise. On the one hand, such a view 
yields implausible verdicts for when agents act wrongly on a false but justified 
moral belief. On the other hand, justified true belief in the absence of knowledge 
is hard to square with a central feature of morally worthy actions: namely that they 
are not merely right but non-accidentally so. Insofar as a justified true belief fails 
to be knowledge this is generally precisely because the agent’s epistemic 
circumstances are precarious. And so, the agent’s motivation could have easily led 
her astray. Let us now return to the charge that it is ungenerous to refuse an agent 
moral credit when she did the best she could, didn’t act wrongly, and yet fell short 
of knowledge. What do we do about Peter? 
 !e Rightness Condition does rule out that Peter is morally praiseworthy 
for feeding his child spinach. He does not know that this is the right thing to do; it’s 
a matter of luck that he got it right. But this in and of itself does not strike me as 
ungenerous – after all, it’s just denying moral praise for one particular action. It 
would be ungenerous to say that there is nothing that Peter is morally praiseworthy 
for. But the Rightness Condition is compatible with Peter’s being morally 
praiseworthy for many other actions that he also performed: he may, for example, 
be morally praiseworthy for seeking out advice about his children’s nutrition. !is 
is the right thing to do and plausibly Peter knows that and cares about doing 
what’s right. In the same way, while the doctor does not deserve credit for 
prescribing the correct medication, this is not to deny that she deserves credit for a 
great many other things that she has done: for assiduously reviewing the lab 
reports and carefully examining the patient.
 !ese considerations highlight that when considering whether an agent 
deserves moral praise for an action, we must take care in identifying exactly which 
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action we take them to be morally praiseworthy for. Individuating actions can 
sometimes be a tricky business. !us, consider the following case: 
Susan knows that a child is drowning in either the right pond or the left 
pond. But she doesn’t know in which one – it’s dark and foggy. She only has 
time to jump into one pond and if she doesn’t do anything the child will die. 
Susan simply picks the left pond and jumps in. She picked correctly and 
manages to save the child. 
Saving the child involved Susan’s jumping into the left pond. Susan didn’t know 
that jumping into the left pond was the right thing to do –  she didn’t have any 
evidence for thinking the child was more likely to be left rather than right. So, on 
the Rightness Condition Susan is not morally praiseworthy for jumping into the 
left pond.  !is does not strike me as counterintuitive: Susan was lucky that she 
got it right. But Susan’s saving the child involved many other actions of which she 
plausibly did know that they were the right thing to do. Prior to jumping into one 
of the ponds, she knew that she was morally required to do something – doing 
nothing would have meant the sure death of the child. And once she had jumped 
in and found the child, she knew that the right thing to do was to get the child 
out of the water. !ese actions were necessary for saving the child. And she knew 
that they were the right thing to do. On the Rightness Condition she is morally 
praiseworthy for them. Susan’s saving the child picks out a cluster of actions; and 
most of those (albeit not all) on the Rightness Condition, do have moral worth.
 !e aim of this section was to argue that the Rightness Condition provides 
us with necessary conditions for moral worth. For an agent to deserve moral credit 
for her right action, she needs to be motivated both by moral concern – a conative 
attitude with moral content – and by moral knowledge. !e conative requirement 
explains why right actions performed from ulterior motives do not have moral 
worth. It also explains why when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is 
not only disposed to do the right thing reliably, but also to manifest a range of 
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reactive attitudes, including praise, blame, guilt, indignation. !e knowledge 
requirement guarantees that morally worthy actions are not just accidentally right. 
On the Rightness Condition then, morally worthy actions are counterfactually 
robust along two independent dimensions: the agent’s desire to do what’s right 
means that she would not have performed the action if she had believed it to be 
wrong. !e agent’s moral knowledge means that she would not have been easily 
mistaken about what the right thing to do is. And so, there is a counterfactually 
robust link between the agent’s motivation and her doing the right thing. 
3. Is the Rightness Condition Sufficient? 
I have argued that moral concern and moral knowledge are both necessary for 
moral worth. Does the Rightness Condition also give us a sufficient condition? 
While worries about whether the Rightness Condition is necessary focus on the 
question whether it’s too demanding, concerns about whether it’s sufficient have 
focussed on the question whether it’s demanding enough. !us, Hills has recently 
argued that the Rightness Condition makes moral worth too easy to come by. 
Consider the following case: 
Ron is an extremist, believing that killing a person is not generally immoral 
but that killing a fellow Jew is a grave sin. Ron would like to kill Tamara, 
but he refrains from doing so because he wants to do the right thing, and 
he knows (on the basis of his rabbi’s testimony) that the right thing to do is 
to refrain from killing her.18
 Hills argues that, intuitively, Ron is not morally praiseworthy for resisting 
his desire to kill Tamara. But, she argues, Ron does cares about doing what’s right 
21
18 Hills [2009], p. 115. !e case appears originally in Arpaly [2003], who initially uses it to defend 
a weaker claim: that justified true moral belief along with a desire to do is right is not sufficient for 
moral worth. Arpaly’s later discussion (particularly on p. 73) suggests that she endorses the 
stronger conclusion also: that even desire to do what’s right along with moral knowledge are not 
sufficient for moral worth.  
and based on the rabbi’s testimony he knows what the right thing to do is. And so, 
the Rightness Condition cannot give us a sufficient condition for moral worth. 
!e culprit, Hills argues, is the knowledge requirement. Ron may have moral 
knowledge but he fails to have moral understanding and it’s the latter that matters 
for moral worth. To have moral understanding, an agent must have the abilities to 
give and follow explanations why her action is right and to recognize what the 
right thing to do is in similar circumstances. Moral understanding is hence 
considerably more demanding than knowing what the right thing to do is.19 
 I agree with Hills that Ron does not deserve moral credit for refraining to 
kill Tamara. But I do not think that this intuitive verdict gives us reason to 
abandon the Rightness Condition. !e case that Hills rests her case on is very 
unusual. Why does the question whether he may kill Tamara even arise for Ron? 
Why does he think that killing infidels is morally permissible? Circumstances in 
which a minimally decent moral agent might genuinely wonder whether it’s 
morally permissible to kill another person are rare.
 Here’s a natural way to fill in the story: Having grown up in a 
fundamentalist society, Ron has never encountered anyone who would seriously 
question that all infidels that must be exterminated. Ron is not a psychopath; he is 
simply not particularly reflective. With this background, Ron’s belief that it’s 
morally permissible to kill infidels may not be unreasonable. If he has been 
steeped in propaganda enough, we can see how he might think it to be his duty to 
kill any infidel he comes across. I believe that when we are invited to consult our 
intuitions about this case, this is how we are inclined to fill in the details. And 
then, Hills’ assessment of the case seems right: intuitively, Ron isn’t praiseworthy 
for refraining to kill Tamara. But on this way of filling in the details Ron cannot 
know that it would be wrong to kill Tamara. To come to know what the right 
thing to do is based on testimony, Ron must be in a position to identify a reliable 
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19 Hills also argues that it’s distinct from simply knowing why something is the right thing to do. 
See her [2009], pp. 103-106.
advisor. But if Ron is so morally incompetent that he needs help to decide 
whether he may kill another human, and if he has such misguided moral beliefs 
that he believes there is nothing wrong with killing an infidel, how could he 
possibly be in a position to identify an advisor who can be a reliable source of 
moral guidance?
 !us, insofar as Hills is stipulating that Ron acquires moral knowledge 
based on testimony despite his lack of basic moral competence, she is describing a 
case that is subtly incoherent. And if she is not stipulating that Ron, then the case 
is so unusual that it’s too under-described to gauge our intuitions. Even if there is 
a way to fill in the story so that it’s plausible that Ron is (1) believes that there is 
nothing morally objectionable with killing a fellow human and yet (2) morally 
competent enough to identify a reliable moral advisor, it’s not at all clear that with 
the relevant details filled in, it will still yield the intuitive judgment that Ron is not 
morally praiseworthy for his action.
 As described Ron’s case doesn’t impugn the Rightness Condition. On the 
contrary, it seems quite natural to appeal to Ron’s lack of moral knowledge to 
explain why he isn’t morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing. Given Ron’s 
moral incompetence, he was lucky to come across a reliable advisor and to do the 
right thing. Ron’s case then lends further support to the knowledge requirement as 
necessary for moral worth.
 Ron’s action lacks moral worth, not because he acts on moral testimony but 
because he fails to have moral knowledge. But sometimes agents do gain 
knowledge of what the right thing do is by relying on others. In such cases, the 
Rightness Condition implies that their right actions can have moral worth. !is is 
a welcome consequence. Consider the following case: 
Advice: Anna’s older sister is struggling with alcohol addiction; she lost her job, 
blew through her savings and is several months behind on rent. She asks Anna 
to “loan” her some money. Anna is conflicted. On the one hand, she does not 
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want her sister to end up homeless. But she wonders whether her sister needs 
to feel the full consequences of her addiction to finally seek treatment. 
Moreover, Anna’s financial circumstances are modest and she has her own 
family to look after. Anna is uncertain what the right thing to do is. She turns 
to a friend whom she knows to be trustworthy and to have good judgment for 
advice. Her friend tells Anna that she shouldn’t give her sister the money. 
Anna’s friend is right: the moral considerations against giving her sister the 
money do outweigh those in favor of it. Anna trusts her friend and acts on her 
advice. Although it’s hard on her, she stays firm and resists her sister’s rage and 
pleas for help.
 Intuitively, Anna is morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing and 
refusing to give her sister money. Anna’s case is very different from Ron’s. She is 
morally uncertain because she is faced with a genuinely difficult moral situation 
and she has good reason to worry about being biased. Even if she is aware of what 
all the relevant moral considerations are, she may well be uncertain about how to 
balance them. In difficult situation like this, her seeking out advice is a sign of 
moral competence: it shows that she is aware of her own moral limitations. Unlike 
Ron, Anna is well-positioned to identify a reliable moral advisor. And so, it’s 
plausible that Anna by relying on her testimony comes to know that refusing to give 
money to her sister is the right thing to do.20  Since she knows what the right 
thing to do is and wants to do what’s right, it’s hardly accidental that she acts 
rightly. 
 While the Rightness Condition allows that some actions on moral 
testimony have moral worth, it doesn’t follow that all such actions do. Hills’ 
objection to the Rightness Condition rests on the assumption that moral 
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20 !is assumes that we can acquire moral knowledge on the basis of moral testimony. While a 
number of people have argued that moral testimony is problematic (see Hopkins [2007], McGrath 
[2011]), most don’t think that failure to transmit knowledge is the problem. An exception to this is 
McGrath [2010] 
knowledge, and testimonial moral knowledge in particular, is cheap. But this 
assumption is false. Generally, to be in a position to know that p, an agent must be 
epistemically competent, i.e. reliable, responsive to evidence, sober, non-
delusional,... Testimonial knowledge isn’t exempt from them. 
 While the Rightness Condition accommodates Anna’ s action as having 
moral worth, such cases create problems for alternative accounts of moral worth, 
on which being motivated by right-making reasons de re is necessary for moral 
worth, as defended by Arpaly and Markovits.21 !e problem is that there isn’t an 
account of right-making reasons which will yield the right verdict in cases like 
Anna’s without committing one to unpalatable consequences in other cases. 
 According to Arpaly, right-making reasons are those features of an action 
that explain why it is the right thing to do and an agent needs to be motivated by 
concern for these features.22 But reliable moral testimony doesn’t explain why an 
action is right. What explains why Anna should not give her sister money are the 
non-moral facts about Anna’s situation – the fact that doing so would make 
Anna’s sister worse-off in the long run, for example. Moral testimony isn’t a right-
making reason; it’s evidence about what right-making reasons there are and what 
they on balance support. !us, when Anna does the right thing because she wants 
to do what’s right and knows, based on her friend’s testimony what that is, she is 
not acting on right-making reasons de re. She is acting from a desire with moral 
content along with moral knowledge: knowledge what’s right and what the right-
making reasons are. And so, on Arpaly’s view, her action lacks moral worth.23 
 !is is an implausible result. Given Anna’s doubts about her own moral 
judgment, it is a good thing that she relied on moral testimony. More than that: it 
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21 Markovits [2010] argues that her Coincident Reasons !esis gives us both necessary and 
sufficient conditions for moral worth. Arpaly [2003] offers “Praiseworthiness as Response to Moral 
Reasons” (p. 84) as a necessary and sufficient condition for moral worth. 
22 Arpaly [2003], p. 84.
23 See her discussion in Arpaly [2003], p. 73.
seems that she acted virtuously. After all, it’s morally admirable to know one’s own 
moral limitations and to take them into account when deciding how to act. We 
admire the surgeon who consults her textbook or her colleague when she reaches 
the end of her wisdom rather than trying to muddle through on her own, 
endangering her patient. Similarly, we should regard the moral agent who knows 
when to look for advice as morally admirable. 
 Markovits seeks to accommodate cases like Anna by adopting a more 
liberal account of right-making reasons. Markovits suggests that a feature of a 
situation is right-making reason if it provides evidence for an action’s rightness.24 
While this account of right-making reasons allows Markovits to accommodate 
actions like Anna’s, it has troubling consequences elsewhere. We can imagine cases 
in which the fact that an injection is more painful than the alternatives may be 
evidence for its effectiveness. Hence the fact that injecting you with the drug will 
cause you more pain can be a right-making reason. !e sadistic doctor who 
prescribes the painful injection because it’s painful and because she non-
instrumentally cares about causing you pain is then, on Markovits’ account, 
motivated by concern for a right-making reason. !us, according to 
Markovits,  her action has moral worth. !is strikes me as an unacceptable 
consequence.   
 !e Rightness Condition avoids these unpalatable consequences. At the 
same time it does not deny that being responsive to right-making reasons is very 
important for performing morally praiseworthy actions. On the contrary: morally 
relevant features – features that either explain the rightness of an action or that 
reliably correlate with an action’s being right – comprise one’s moral evidence. 
Being responsive to our moral evidence is crucial for moral knowledge. 
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24 Markovits [2010], see particularly her discussion on p. 219.  Markovits’ account of right-making 
reasons is close to the one defended in Kearns & Star [2009].
  I have argued that the Rightness Condition gives us a sufficient condition 
for morally worthy actions. !is is because if the agent is motivated by concern for 
doing what’s right and knowledge of what morality requires, then there is a 
counterfactually stable link between the agent’s right action and her motivation. 
!e Rightness Condition gives us a principled account of this counterfactual link. 
It also allows that agents in many different kinds of epistemic situations can act in 
morally worthy way; moral knowledge can come from many sources – 
deliberation, testimony, or first-hand evidence.  
4. Being Good and Acting Well
We can evaluate whether actions have moral worth. But we can also morally 
evaluate agents: we can evaluate the extent to which someone is a morally good 
person. While accounts of moral worth tell us how to do the former, they plausibly 
have implications for the latter. A central objection to the Rightness Condition, 
the much-discussed case of Huckleberry Finn – argues that these implications are 
implausible. !e aim of this section is to respond to this objection and, in doing 
so, to outline the relationship between moral worth of actions and moral goodness 
of agents. 
  Let’s start with Huckleberry Finn. Huckleberry Finn escapes his 
abusive father. He meets Jim, a fugitive slave and together they embark on a trip 
down the Mississippi river on a raft. !ey make it through quite a few adventures 
together. !en, suddenly, it occurs to Huckleberry that helping a fugitive slave is 
like ‘stealing’. In the grip of his ill-trained conscience, Huckleberry resolves to turn 
Jim over to the authorities. But when the crucial moment comes, Huckleberry 
finds that he cannot go through with his resolution. Instead, he makes up an 
elaborate story that protects Jim. In doing so, he clearly does the right thing. 
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However, he believes that he is acting wrongly: he continues to believe that he is 
complicit in ‘stealing property’ from Jim’s ‘rightful owner’, Miss Watson.25 
 Arpaly’s argues that Huckleberry presents the Rightness Condition with 
the following challenge: if the Rightness Condition is correct, then moral 
ignorance is incompatible with morally worthy actions. If we take moral ignorance 
to be incompatible with morally worthy action, then we have to regard it as 
incompatible with being a morally good person. And if we regard moral ignorance 
as incompatible with being a good person, then Huckleberry Finn turns out to be 
a bad person. But this is implausible: 
 Huckleberry Finn [...] is not a bad boy who has accidentally done 
something good, but a good boy.” 26
 Arpaly argues that many people hold profoundly misguided moral views 
and yet strike us as fundamentally decent and good: 
Huckleberry Finn is not an isolated case. [...] it is not dissimilar to a 
considerably more common type of behavioral inconsistency – the person 
whose explicit views with regard to morality and politics are terribly wrong 
but who in everyday life “cannot hurt a fly.” We all have friends, family 
members or acquaintances of this sort. We can all recall the likes of a 
student who, waving his copy of Atlas Shrugged in one’s face, preaches that 
one should be selfish and then proceeds to lose sleep generously helping his 
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25 !e episode appears in Twain [1884], Chapter XVI. In the context of the moral worth debate, 
the case is discussed first in Bennett [1974]. 
26 Arpaly [2003], p. 78. Driver [2000], p. xvi, objects to regarding moral knowledge as central to 
virtue on similar grounds:
!e Huckleberry Finn case...illustrates a person who has demonstrably false beliefs about the good. 
But if virtue theorists insist that Huckleberry lacks virtue because of his flawed cognitive state, 
then this is bad news for most of us, who, even in some small way, are likely to harbor false views of 
value. !e psychological requirements placed on virtue in the classical tradition seem far too rigid 
and unrealistic.
peers. If philosophers were right in believing [...] that only actions derived 
by deliberation from one’s moral principles are done for moral reasons, we 
would have to view these people as bad people who happen to have some 
fortunate inclinations in their makeup. More commonly, however, we treat 
these people as fundamentally good people who happen to be incompetent 
abstract thinkers.27 
  !e Rightness Condition does not commit us to seeing 
Huckleberry as a “bad boy who has accidentally done something good”. It does 
imply that moral knowledge is a central part of being a good person. And it also 
implies that Huckleberry’s action of protecting Jim in the crucial moment does 
not have moral worth. But whether someone is fundamentally good does not 
hinge on whether a particular action of theirs has moral worth. Fundamentally 
good people sometimes fail to act in morally admirable ways and fundamentally 
bad people may occasionally perform morally admirable actions. !e Rightness 
Condition suggests that Huckleberry is a “fundamentally good” but imperfect boy 
who, on this particular occasion, was lucky to act rightly. And this, I will argue, is 
very plausible. 
 What does the Rightness Condition say about evaluating agents? !e 
following seems like a truism: morally good people generally act in morally 
admirable ways. If acting in morally admirable ways requires moral concern and 
moral knowledge, we can draw the conclusion that morally good people are 
generally motivated by moral concern and knowledge of what’s right. !us, the 
Rightness Condition suggests that a morally good cares deeply about doing what’s 
right and is morally competent. 
 !ere is an important difference in what matters for the moral evaluation 
of an action and what matters for the moral evaluation of an agent. Whether a 
particular action has moral worth depends only on whether it was motivated in 
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27 Arpaly [2003], p. 78. 
the right way: by moral concern and knowledge that it’s right. In contrast, whether 
and the extent to which an agent is morally good depends on the pattern of her 
motivation. Being good is something that admits of degrees. Agents can be more or 
less morally competent; they can know what’s right in some situations while being 
prone to moral mistakes in others. !ey can more or less deeply about doing 
what’s right. How virtuous an agent depends on  which morally praiseworthy 
actions they are in a position to perform. A morally good person is in a position to 
know what’s right even in tricky situations, in which those less virtuous are at a 
loss. (!is is why morally good people make good moral advisors.) Second, the 
depth of moral concern enable her to perform right actions that would be difficult 
for others: such as risking one’s life to save a stranger.28  And so the Rightness 
Condition suggests:   
An agent is morally good to the extent to which she both cares about doing 
what’s right and she is morally competent, i.e. she generally knows what the 
right thing to do is. 
 Let us first see what the Rightness Condition says about Huckleberry’s 
action. According to the Rightness Condition, Huckleberry is morally 
praiseworthy for helping a fugitive slave if and only if he is motivated by his 
concern for doing what’s right and his knowledge that helping a fugitive slave is 
the right thing to do. But, plausibly, Huckleberry does not know that helping a 
fugitive slave is the right thing to do: he believes that he is complicit in moral 
wrong-doing. Huckleberry’s belief, while unfortunate, is not unreasonable; it is a 
widely accepted view held even by those who are morally reliable on many 
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28 !e Rightness Condition thus departs from the “battle citation” model of moral worth, discussed 
by Henson [1979], on which attributing moral worth to actions “acknowledges a moral victory 
against odds” (p. 50). !e odds need not have been unfavorable for an agent to deserve moral credit 
for her right action. But of course there may be good pedagogical reasons for giving the agent more 
praise in such circumstances.     
questions, other than the permissibility of slavery. Huckleberry is thus not morally 
praiseworthy for helping a fugitive slave. 
 What about the evaluation of Huckleberry as an agent? Whether 
Huckleberry Finn is a “good boy” does not hinge on whether a particular action of 
his has moral worth. It depends on the Huckleberry the overall pattern of his 
motivations and on whether he is generally morally competent and cares about 
doing what’s right. Huckleberry may have false beliefs about the permissibility of 
slavery. But we regard Huckleberry as “fundamentally good” precisely because 
Mark Twain’s story gives us plenty of evidence that, for the most part, he does 
know right from wrong: he generally knows to treat others fairly, he knows to 
keep his promises, he knows when to be loyal. Huckleberry also cares about doing 
what’s right: after all, he apologizes after treating Jim badly. But a genuine apology 
requires both moral insight and moral concern – it involves recognizing that one 
has acted as one should not have and that for this reason one ought to make 
amends.29 
 !e point that agents can be morally competent in some, perhaps most, 
situations while being systematically morally ignorant in others, generalizes. !e 
fact that Arpaly’s libertarian student is mistaken about what the right thing to do 
is when discussing politics or giving to charity is compatible with his knowing 
what the right thing to do is when confronted with a friend in need.30  !is 
phenomenon is not limited to moral cases: I know where my friend lives when I’m 
driving there but not when I have to explain the way to someone else. I may have 
false beliefs about gravitational force when solving physics equations but not when 
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29 I’m puzzled by Arpaly’s take on this; she suggests that Huckleberry “finds himself ” apologizing 
to Jim without having any moral insight or beliefs. See her [2003], p. 77. A sincere apology 
expresses remorse; hence it requires the insight that one has treated someone in a way that one 
should not have. See Martin [2010].
30 !is relates to my discussion in Section 2.1: if he was not disposed to feel guilt upon letting his 
friend down, I doubt that his helping his friend would strike us as admirable. 
I’m standing on the baseball pitch, catching the ball. Recently, philosophers of 
mind and epistemologists have suggested that we should describe such agents as 
having divided or “fragmented” cognitive states. While their proposals differ in 
important details, the general strategy is to argue that all-out belief is too crude a 
tool to adequately describe the cognitive state of such agents; instead we should 
ascribe to them different beliefs (or aspects of belief ) in different contexts.31 !e 
libertarian student may well believe that we should be selfish – and hence be 
morally ignorant – in the context of classroom discussions. It does not follow that 
he believes that we should be selfish when dealing with family and friends and 
others in need. In these situations he may well know that he is required to help 
and his actions may have moral worth. And if his moral ignorance is confined to a 
narrow class of situations, then he may well be a fundamentally admirable person. 
 !e Rightness Condition is compatible with Huckleberry’s being a 
fundamentally good boy. Still, it commits us to regard even his more limited moral 
ignorance as a moral flaw. !is is exactly as it should be. Moral ignorance is a 
moral flaw because it makes us systematically vulnerable to moral mistakes: it 
leads to moral blind spots. While it may be that the libertarian “cannot hurt a fly” 
in everyday life, he is prone to reach disastrously wrong conclusions when deciding 
which political party to vote for.32 And it was Huckleberry’s moral ignorance – his 
racist beliefs – which led to his morally misguided decision to betray Jim. We 
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31 For different ways of developing this strategy, see Schwitzgebel [2001] and [2002], Gendler 
[2008], and [redacted for anonymous review] [ms]. 
32 !is fits well a growing body of empirical research on this topic, which suggests that the ordinary 
cases of sexism and racism that we encounter among “fundamentally decent” people are not just a 
matter of poor abstract reasoning. !ese mistaken moral views systematically manifest themselves 
in a plethora of biases in their everyday moral decision-making. Even those who explicitly endorse 
liberal views but grew up in societies that are structured by race or gender are not immune from 
such biases. But agents who in addition hold mistaken moral views are in a particularly bad 
epistemic position: they are precluded from recognizing their biases as such and thus take 
compensatory measures. For an overview, see Banaji & Greenwald [2013].  
cannot blame Huckleberry for having acquired these attitudes. Nevertheless, they 
represent a moral flaw; Huckleberry just as the libertarian student would be 
morally better people if they lacked their false moral convictions. 
 I want to end by returning to Huckleberry’s action, when rather than 
turning Jim in he protects him instead. I have said that the Rightness Condition 
implies that Huckleberry is not morally praiseworthy for protecting Jim. But this 
is not to say that there is nothing to admire about Huckleberry’s action. Let’s look 
at the crucial moment that prompts Huckleberry to abandon his misguided plan 
occurs just as Huckleberry is departing from the raft that he and Jim share in 
order to tell on Jim. As he sets out, Jim calls after him: 
Pooty soon I’ll be a shout’n for joy, en I’ll say, it’s all on account o’ Huck; I’s a 
free man, en I couldn’t ever ben free ef it hadn’t been for Huck; Huck done 
it. Jim won’t ever forgit you, Huck; you’s de bes’ fren’ Jim’s ever had; en you’s 
de only fren’ ole Jim’s got now.33
When Huckleberry hears Jim’s words, his resolve starts melting away:
I was paddling off, all in a sweat to tell on him; but when he says this, it 
seemed to kind of take the tuck all out of me.34 
 Arpaly and Markovits both take Huckleberry to be responding to Jim’s 
personhood. But that seems like a very sophisticated concern to attribute to 
someone like Huckleberry. Rather it seems that Huckleberry responded to Jim’s 
reminder of their friendship. It’s not surprising that this reminder should stop 
Huckleberry in his tracks. Huckleberry knows that loyalty is a central demand of 
friendship. If there is one norm of friendship, it’s that friends stick together, don’t 
tell on each other, and help each other in need.35  Plausibly, Huckleberry knows 
what being a good friend requires and he cares about Jim’s friendship. Insofar as 
33
33 Twain, p. 103.
34 ibid.
35 In fact, at a number of points in the novel Huckleberry explicitly reflects on these demands. My 
discussion here follows Manne [forthcoming].
this is what motivates him, it’s not an accident that he protects his friend Jim and he 
is praiseworthy for being a good friend. Being a good friend is something that we 
value in others for its own sake. And so, it’s not surprising, that Huckleberry’s 
action strikes us as admirable. 
 At the same time Huckleberry is a morally lucky boy: Jim protects him as 
much as he protects Jim. By reminding him of their friendship, Jim prevents 
Huckleberry from committing a grave moral mistake.   
5. Conclusion
I have defended the Rightness Condition as an account of moral worth, arguing 
that morally worthy actions require that the agent be motivated by both concern 
for doing what’s right as well as knowledge of what the right thing to do is. !e 
Rightness Condition both accommodates and explains a central feature of morally 
worthy actions: that their rightness is not just “contingent” and “precarious”. It 
recognizes there is more to acting admirably than mere reliability. Moral 
motivation is also about being disposed to manifest a range of reactive attitudes – 
guilt, resentment, admiration. Finally, it makes moral worth neither too easy to 
come by nor too hard to attain for imperfect and limited agents like us.  
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